- UCC 2-204 (3)
- R2C sect. 33 comment a
Assignment 23 The Requirement of Definiteness --RE-DO
Read: C 251‐262; Note 1 on 253; Note 4 on 254; Notes 1, 3 & 4 on 256‐257; Notes 1 & 2 on 261
S 204 §§ 33 & 34; 33 UCC 2‐204(3); 42 UCC 2‐305(1)
Brief: Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co.
Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc.
- Toys, Inc. v. FM Burlington Co.
- Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc.
The terms of the offer must be sufficiently clear and complete so that the court can determine what the parties intended & can fix damages in the case of non-performance.
Rationale of this rule-
Two things the court can determine if the language is clear:
-Terms of the damn thing & whether or not they were broken
-Damages. (In theory, if bad faith can be proved by P expectation damages can be awarded/protected).
***One depends on another.
Disclosure v. definiteness
Good faith does NOT require full disclosure of bargaining strategy… see p. 253 for margin comment
Not definite
-Pure conjectures like "I'l give you a fair share" (amounts subj to the view of a particular person whose guess is considered)
"Such an executory K must rest for the performance of the honor & good faith of the promisor."
References in this section:
Fairmount
Wood v. Lucy
How to determine whether a K is too indefinite to enforce:
-Often, cts will piece together enough terms to satisfy the requirement of definitenes
Sources of these "pieces" include: | Prelim negotiations like prior comm'ns, references to external sources such as gov't regulations, trade usages, prior courses of dealing b/n the parties, course of performance b/n them after their agreements, etc. | |
Rules | UCC 1-205; 2-208 |
Terms will sometimes be supplied by law.
Factual implications may supply/supplement terms that appear to be too indefinite.
The courts will furnish implied in fact terms from the dealings & relationship of the parties if not expressly covered by the parties. (trial courts have authority to do this)
-failure to specify does not invalidate the K.
- Courts WILL imply a reasonable price if price is completely omitted.
- Courts WILL NOT do the same for situations where the price stated is too indefinite.
- Courts will call it "too indefinite"
- Courts will call it "too indefinite"
Rules re: price flexibility
-UCC 2-305
-UCC 2-723
-UCC 2-724
Helpful analogies + more 256 & 257
Toys, Inc. v. FM Burlington Co.
Vt. 1990
(Conditional acceptance of an option to renew)
Facts:
P wanted new lease on its terms; D wanted old terms (option K always existed b/n parties)
PH:
Summ J for P in lower ct
Issue on appeal:
Whether the lease provision created a valid option for P to renew for another five year or was it too indefinite to be enforceable?
D's argument:
Emphasis on "renegotiate" in the renewal cause which to them shows the intent to reach a future agreement.
Rules:
The option K must contain all material & essential terms to be in the subsequent document. It doesn't ened everything, just the main stuff…
Point of problem: | Price term. "The then prevailing rate w/n the mall." |
Analysis:
Ct does not think this is too indefinite. The agreement says prevailing rate at the mall… this is something that could be determined, which D furnishd a few days after P stated its intent to exercise its option to renew its lease.
Prevailing rate is not too indefinite b/c of protections of the parties… mkts fluctuate. This was long-term. Instead of the parties agreeing on specific price 5 years out, they decided to agree on one objective indicator.
Conclusion:
Affirmed. The price term in the option K was definite enough to make the option enforceable.
Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc.
Facts:
Primary & secondary pricing mechanism present in LOOONG term K.
Primary | Publication in industry that publishes prevailing shipping rate | |
Secondary | Mutually agreement by parties, as recognized by the leading iron oore shippers in such season for the transportation of iron ore |
-There's a downturn in the industry
-1985: Primary mechanism stops publishing
-Then secondary mechanism also fails b/c indepen shippers stopped publishing their rates.
-Problem: What is a reasonable rate for the K?
PH:
P sues, asking for ct to set rsble rate for shipping
Trial ct ruled that K was binding & came out w/ terms
Issue in lower ct:
Is there a K here, and if there is, what are its terms?
Issues in app ct:
- Intent to be bound by both?
- T ct err in establishing its K?
- Was trial ct correct to retain equitable jx over the case and order the parties to use a mediator if they could not mutally agree in a given seaon… Basically t ct retained jx for the future.
D's argument on app:
-B/c both mechanisms broke down & only 2 were contemplated by parties in K, b/c they broke down renders K unenforceable.
-the t ct did not have jx to impose a shipping rate when the rate did not conform w/ the pricing mechanisms furnished in earlier K
Analysis of instant:
-Parties did intent to be bound… it's a seriously long K (1957-2010)
Factors of definiteness/intent were present
So, despite failure of pricing mechanisms, parties intended to be bound
-Lower ct did have ability to assign price term
The missing price term could be determined w/ reference to common law & UCC for a "reasonable price"
-Awarding damages would be too speculative… performance held to be better idea
-Did lower ct err to order specific performance& retain equitable jx?
No. B/c performance is required (v. damages… awarding "future damages" = way too speculative) but, how to monitor/enforce performance if jx is NOT retained???
-This is an unusual result, but required in this case.
Liikely the parties later settled b/c there's a lot of motivation for parties to work it out when cts retain jx in efforts to NOT displease the judge.
Conclusion:
Affirmed.
-parties intended to be bound
-performance was appropriate remedy
-trial ct used right procedure/analysis
1 comment:
Great post! My favorite case is Hamer v. Sidway.
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